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ABSTRACT
Are individuals who trust others better off than those who do not? Do
trustworthy people prosper more than untrustworthy ones? We first pose these
questions in a search model where individuals face repeated choices between
trusting (initiating an investment transaction) and not trusting, and between being
trustworthy (not stealing the investment) and cheating. We then derive predictions
for the relationship between observed individual behavior, aggregate attitudes, and
individual prosperity. Finally, we evaluate these predictions empirically using
household-level data for eighteen (mostly developed) countries from the World
Values Survey. We find that, on average, a trusting attitude has a positive impact
on income, while trustworthiness has a negative impact on income. In addition, we
find evidence of complementarity between these two attitudes and the aggregate
levels of the complementary attitudes. Most strikingly, the payoff to being










The notions of trust and trustworthiness have received much recent attention
in social science, stimulated in part by the work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama
(1995), but with antecedents in, for example, Coleman (1990). Economists have for
a long time recognized the critical role played by trust in economic performance.
Arrow (1972), for example, remarks: “Virtually every commercial transaction has
within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period
of time. It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in the
world can be explained by the lack of mutual conﬁdence.” In high-trust societies,
individuals need to spend less resources to protect themselves from being exploited
in economic transactions. Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that trusting societies
tend to have stronger incentives to innovate and to accumulate both physical and
human capital and, as a result, grow faster. Zak and Knack (2000) corroborate
the positive eﬀect of aggregate trust on growth. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)
investigate the individual-level determinants of trust within the United States and
ﬁnd that income and education are strongly positively correlated with trust.
The ﬂip side of trust is trustworthiness. Glaeser et al (2000) distinguish between
trusting behavior, which they deﬁne as “the commitment of resources to an activity
where the outcome depends upon the cooperative behavior of others,” and trustwor-
thy behavior, which “increases the returns to people who trust you.” The idea of
reputation–the level of trust one is perceived to merit–has also been examined. As
Axelrod (1986) puts it, an individual’s reputation derives from adherence to or vio-
1lation of a norm that others view as a signal about the individual’s future behavior
in a wide variety of situations.
In this paper, we begin the task of linking the microeconomic theory to empir-
ical evidence based on micro data. We start by developing an equilibrium search
model in which individuals face repeated choices between trusting and not trusting,
and between being trustworthy and cheating. Each person possesses individual-
speciﬁc intrinsic predispositions to trust and trustworthiness. In addition to these
intrinsic preferences, the person is strategic: he considers how his actions may af-
fect his chance of developing and sustaining a current match and forming beneﬁcial
matches in the future. In equilibrium, his strategic actions are guided by the equi-
librium distribution of his opponents’ actions, i.e., by the equilibrium probability
that a randomly chosen individual will trust, and will act in a trustworthy man-
ner. Given the individual heterogeneity in the intrinsic predispositions to trust and
trustworthiness, equilibrium entails both trusting and mistrusting individuals, and
both trustworthy and cheating individuals.
There have been several recent theoretical contributions addressing the issue of
trust. Tirole (1996) develops a dynamic model where there may exist a certain level
of trust between individuals due to the considerations of individual and collective
reputation.1 Although there is some heterogeneity in the tendency towards trust-
worthy behavior in his model, he does not consider heterogeneity in the tendency
towards trusting behavior. On the other hand, Chen (2000) develops a model in
1Dixit (2001) studies the role of individual reputation and informational intermediaries in a
similar framework.
2which individuals diﬀer in their intrinsic preferences for being honest, or trustwor-
thy, as captured by the notion of a population distribution of trustworthiness. But
his focus is on the role of trust in contracting, and he takes a reduced-form approach
where dynamic eﬀects are not explicitly considered.
The present model overcomes these limitations by integrating individual het-
erogeneity in the behavioral predisposition toward both trusting and trustworthy
behavior with the dynamic considerations. In contrast to Tirole (1996), the in-
troduction of heterogeneity in the behavioral predisposition for both trusting and
trustworthy behavior leads to the joint determination of the behavioral predispo-
sition cutoﬀs separating trusting and trustworthy behavior in equilibrium. One
implication of this enrichment of the model is that a change in the distribution of
either of the two predispositions aﬀects the extent of both trusting and trustworthy
behavior. In addition, the resulting two-sided behavioral heterogeneity allows us to
compare the equilibrium monetary payoﬀs associated with acting in a trusting versus
untrusting manner as well as acting in a trustworthy manner versus untrustworthy
manner, which is the central question addressed in this paper.
Based on our theoretical framework, we estimate a model of the private return to
trust and trustworthiness, using data from eighteen countries from the 1990 World
Values Survey. We ﬁnd evidence that the return to trustworthiness is negative on
average and depends (in a statistically signiﬁcant way) on the average amount of
trust in the society. In particular, this return is negative in low-trust countries and
positive in high-trust countries. We also ﬁnd that the return to trust is positive on
average and some of our results suggest that it is related in a positive way to the
3average amount of trustworthiness in the society. However, this relationship appears
to be statistically less robust than the previous one, although the sign pattern is
consistent throughout various speciﬁcations. Strikingly, these results suggest the
possibility that a country might be in an equilibrium trap where it is not in most
people’s interest to invest in either trust or trustworthiness.
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 develops the theoretical
model. Section 3 discusses comparative statics results and empirical predictions
of the model. Section 4 reviews previous empirical work. Section 5 describes the
dataset we use. Section 6 contains our empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Technical proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
There is a continuum of individuals with a total measure normalized to 1. The
output in the economy is created from business transactions. Each transaction has
two parties to it: an initiator and a respondent. Each individual simultaneously
participates in both roles. An initiator initiates a transaction by ’investing’ 1 unit
of a generic good, and a respondent, who if responding honestly, contributes to a
successful completion of the transaction. In such case the total payoﬀ from the
transaction is 2a + 1 and the net output of 2a is shared equally by the two parties,
giving a net payoﬀ a to each party. However, the respondent may also respond
4dishonestly by ’stealing’ the investment. In such case the net payoﬀ to the initiator
is ¡1 and the net payoﬀ to the respondent is 1 ¡ d, where d measures inherent
disutility from being dishonest, or intrinsic honesty. The value of d is individual-
speciﬁc with support [d;d] and with a continuous distribution function F that is
strictly increasing on [d;d]. To make the dishonest response potentially attractive
to at least some respondents, we assume that a < 1 ¡ d. In light of this possibility,
the initiator may decide not to initiate a transaction in the ﬁrst place. In such case
the net payoﬀ to the initiator is ¡m and the net payoﬀ to the respondent is 0, where
m is an individual-speciﬁc inherent propensity to trust, captured by the disutility
m of mistrust. The value of m has support [m;m] and a continuous distribution
function G that is strictly increasing on [m;m].23 If a transaction is not initiated or
if an initiated transaction is met with a dishonest response, there is no net output
produced (the theft is just a transfer). The extensive form of the transaction game
is pictured in Figure 1.
This setup tries to capture the distinction between trust and trustworthiness and
the impact both of these have on individual prosperity. Successful completion of a
transaction requires both a trusting approach of the initiator and a trustworthy ap-
proach of the respondent.4 In case either of them is missing, the transaction fails and
no net output is produced (although some existing wealth might be redistributed).
Each period a subgroup of initiators interacts with a subgroup of respondents by
2The assumptions of F and G being strictly increasing on the two supports are only made for
presentational convenience. None of the results is aﬀected by dropping this assumption.
3Note that we do not assume that d and m are distributed independently across individuals.
Indeed, they may be correlated. Whether they are correlated or not, however, is immaterial to the
subsequent analysis since each individual acts independently in his initiator and respondent roles.
















FIGURE 1: Extensive form of the transaction game
participating in an initiator-respondent match. Even though each individual has a
dual role in each period, acting both as an initiator in one match and a respondent
in another, it is helpful to separate these two roles and to think of the initiators and
the respondents as two separate groups of the same size.5 At the beginning of each
period there are equally sized groups of matched initiators and matched respondents
and equally sized groups of unmatched initiators and unmatched respondents. Those
matched participate in their ”surviving” matches from the previous period. Each
unmatched initiator gets matched with probability ¯ 2 (0;1) to some unmatched
respondent and vice versa. Then, by the law of large numbers, ¯ is also the fraction
of both the searching initiators and the searching respondents who get matched
in a new match within a period. If an initiator or a respondent is unmatched,
5This simpliﬁcation is valid since the two matches of an individual (one in the initiator role and
one in the respondent role) are generically diﬀerent (their coincidence is a zero probability event).
6his or her payoﬀ for the current period is 0. If an initiator and a respondent are
matched (in a new or a surviving match), they play the transaction game outlined
above and collect their payoﬀs. If the transaction is completed successfully (i.e.
it is initiated and responded to honestly), the match survives to the next period
with probability ® 2 (0;1). Otherwise it is dissolved and both participants will
enter the next period as unmatched. The latter is also the case if the transaction
is completed successfully but, conditional on that, the match does not survive until
the next period for exogenous reasons, which happens with probability 1 ¡ ®. In
turn, ® is then also the fraction of matches with successfully completed transactions
that actually survive to the next period. Intuitively, even if the match is ”working”,
exogenous events such as population mobility or business turnover may cause the
match to break up. All individuals are risk neutral and have a discount factor
± 2 (0;1): We assume that ® > ¯, i.e., that a working match is more likely to
survive than a search is to result in a new match.
To make the analysis tractable, we restrict our attention to steady states and
make the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 1: All the disclosed or inferred information about a partner in a
transaction is speciﬁc to and lasts only during a given repeated match (i.e., there is
no social learning and no memory).
Assumption 2: Both the initiators and the respondents condition their strate-
gies only on what happened within the current period, on whether the present match
is new or surviving and on the aggregate steady state probability of an initiator ini-
7tiating (p) and a respondent responding honestly (q) in a new match.6
Assumption 3: If an initiator or a respondent is indiﬀerent between two actions,
she or he chooses to initiate or respond honestly, respectively.
In the next subsection, p and q are taken as given and the implied behavior
of individual initiators and respondents is derived. The following subsection then
aggregates these individual decisions to determine p and q endogenously.
2.2 Partial Equilibrium
At the beginning of a period, after both the initiators and the respondents have
realized whether they are matched or not and whether the match is new or surviving,
an initiator (of type) m may ﬁnd herself in the following states with their associated
discounted payoﬀ values (or value functions):
I1: Not matched: I1(m;q)
I2: Matched in a new match: I2(m;q)
I3: Matched in a surviving match: I3(m;q)
The value of q enters into the decisionmaking and value functions of initiators
6This Markovian strategy assumption is made in order to simplify the analysis. Given that a
necessary condition for a match survival is a successful completion of the transaction in each period
while the match lasts, a general strategy space would allow strategies to condition on the age of the
match, since that is the only variable that may diﬀer from one surviving match to another. Indeed,
one could envision an equilibrium in which, conditional on match survival, initiators of type m
initiate until period x(m) and respondents of type d respond honestly until period y(d), where x(¢)
and y(¢) are (weakly) increasing and potentially inﬁnitely valued. In such an equilibrium, given
the age of a particular match, optimal initiator and respondent decisions would be determined by
the intrinsic behavioral propensities and the updated distributions of match partner types (where
the support of the latter only includes opponent types whose strategies prescribe cooperation until
at least the realized age of the match). Intuitively, we focus on equilibria where x(¢) and y(¢)
only assume values of zero or inﬁnity. Although the general class of strategies and equilibria
may be interesting from a purely theoretical standpoint, we believe that the subclass we focus on
suﬃciently captures the essentials of trust and trustworthiness in an equilibrium setting.
8because it captures how likely one is to encounter an honest response in a new
match.7
Based on the realization of whether he is matched or not, whether the match
is new or surviving and whether the initiator has initiated a transaction or not, a
respondent (of type) d may ﬁnd himself in the following states with their associated
discounted payoﬀ values (or value functions):
R1: Not matched: R1(d;p)
R2: Matched in a new match, but without an initiated transaction: R2(d;p)
R3: Matched in a new match with an initiated transaction: R3(d;p)
R4: Matched in a surviving match, but without an initiated transaction: R4(d;p)
R5: Matched in a surviving match with an initiated transaction: R5(d;p)
The value of p enters into the decisionmaking and value functions of initiators
because it captures how likely one is to encounter a trusting initiator in a new
match.8
First, consider the decisionmaking of a respondent d given p (for simplicity of
notation, we omit p from the list of arguments in the value functions). In states
R1, R2 or R4, there is no current decision to be taken and the respondent simply
collects a payoﬀ 0 in the current period. Then he goes searching at the beginning
of the next period, since any existing match is dissolved at the end of the current
7The value of p does not enter into the initiators’ decisionmaking because it only matters to
them to the extent it aﬀects q. Hence q is a suﬃcient statistic from the point of view of the
initiators.
8The value of q does not enter into the respondents’ decisionmaking because it only matters
to them to the extent it aﬀects p. Hence p is a suﬃcient statistic from the point of view of the
respondents.
9period. This implies that
R1(d) = R2(d) = R4(d) (1)
In addition to getting the payoﬀ 0 in the current period, in the next period the
respondent gets matched in a new match with probability ¯ and, conditional on
the latter, he will face an initiated transaction with probability p. Therefore the
Bellman equation for R1(d) is
R1(d) = 0 + ± [(1 ¡ ¯)R1(d) + ¯(1 ¡ p)R2(d) + ¯pR3(d)] (2)
Using (1), this gives
R1(d) = R2(d) = R4(d) =
¯±p
1 ¡ ± + ¯±p
R3(d) (3)
If in state R3 or R5, the respondent must decide whether to respond to the
initiated transaction honestly or dishonestly. If responding dishonestly, he collects
1 ¡ d in the current period and goes searching at the beginning of the next period.
This is quantitatively equivalent to collecting 1 ¡d currently and being in state R1
currently. If responding honestly, with probability 1 ¡ ® the respondent collects a
in the current period and the match dissolves, in which case the respondent goes
searching at the beginning of the next period. This is quantitatively equivalent
to collecting a currently and being in state R1 currently. With probability ® the
respondent collects a in the current period and the match survives.
To be able to judge the value conditional on the survival of the match, the
10respondent has to form a belief about the initiator initiating in the next period in
such scenario. This poses no complication if the current state is R5 because of the
conditioning states used by the initiator in formulating her strategies (Assumption
2). In particular, the initiator will initiate again in the next period because she has
done so in the current period. In other words, the fact that the initiator initiated in
the current period perfectly reveals what action her strategy prescribes for surviving
matches. Hence, in state R5 and conditional on the survival of the match, the
respondent will again ﬁnd himself in state R5 in the next period. Therefore the
Bellman equation for R5(d) is
R5(d) = maxf1 ¡ d + R1(d);(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + ±R5(d)]g (4)
The ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of responding dishonestly
while the second term corresponds to the value of responding honestly.
Analyzing (4) gives the following result:
Lemma 1 All the respondents (irrespective of d) respond honestly in state R5.
Intuitively, if in state R5, the respondent must have chosen to respond honestly in
the previous period (in state R3) even in the presence of uncertainty about whether
the initiator would or would not initiate in the current period. It then follows that
the respondent will also opt to respond honestly once it is certain that the initiator
will initiate in the next period.
11This lemma and (4) then imply that
R5(d) = (1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + ±R5(d)]






(1 ¡ ®±)(1 ¡ ± + ¯±p)
R3(d) (5)
If in state R3, however, it is not obvious from the fact that the initiator has
initiated in the current period that she will do so also in the next period (if the
match survives until then) because the initiator’s strategy may prescribe diﬀerent
actions for states I2 and I3. Hence let k 2 [0;1] be the belief of the respondent
that the initiator will initiate in the next period if the match survives till then.
Because k is deﬁned conditionally on the initiator initiating and the respondent
responding honestly in the current period, its value is, on the same conditioning
set, independent of d and m that characterize the two participants to the current
match. This is because, in the next period, the initiator will only observe that the
match has survived, if it does, not a particular value of d. Similarly, when forming
his belief, the respondent only observes that the transaction has been initiated in
the current period, not a particular value of m. If the initiator does not initiate,
the respondent will get to state R4. In the opposite case the respondent will get to
12state R5. Then, in analogy with (4),
R3(d) = maxf1 ¡ d + R1(d);(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + (1 ¡ k)±R4(d) + k±R5(d)]g
(6)
Again, the ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of responding dis-
honestly while the second term corresponds to the value of responding honestly.
Before continuing the analysis of respondents’ actions in state R3, it is useful to
consider the decisionmaking of the initiators. Hence consider the decisionmaking an
initiator m given q (for simplicity of notation, omit q from the list of arguments in
the value functions). If in state I1, there is no current decision to be taken and the
initiator simply collects a payoﬀ 0 in the current period. In the next period she gets
matched in a new match, hence getting into state I2, with probability ¯ and does
not get matched, hence getting into state I1, with probability 1 ¡ ¯. Therefore the
Bellman equation for I1(m) is




1 ¡ ± + ¯±
I2(m) (8)
If in states I2 or I3, the initiator must decide whether to initiate a transaction
or not. If not initiating, she collects ¡m in the current period and goes searching at
the beginning of the next period. This is quantitatively equivalent to collecting ¡m
currently and being in state 1 currently. If in state I3 and initiating, it follows by
13Lemma 1 that the respondent will respond honestly. Then with probability 1¡® the
initiator collects a in the current period and the match dissolves, in which case the
initiator goes searching at the beginning of the next period. This is quantitatively
equivalent to collecting a currently and being in state I1 currently. With probability
® the initiator collects a in the current period and the match survives, in which case
the respondent will be in state I3 in the next period. Therefore the Bellman equation
for I3(m) is
I3(m) = maxf¡m + I1(m);(1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + ®[a + ±I3(m)]g (9)
The ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of not initiating while the
second term corresponds to the value of initiating.
If in state I2 and initiating, however, it is not certain that the respondent will re-
spond honestly. In particular, since the matching process is random, the probability
of the respondent responding honestly is q. If the respondent responds dishonestly,
the initiator will collect ¡1 in the current period and will go searching at the begin-
ning of the next period. This is quantitatively equivalent to collecting ¡1 currently
and being in state I1 currently. If the respondent responds honestly, reasoning
analogous to state I3 applies. Therefore
I2(m) = maxf¡m + I1(m);(1 ¡ q)[¡1 + I1(m)] (10)
+q ((1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + ®[a + ±I3(m)])g
14Again, the ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of not initiating,
while the second term corresponds to the value of initiating.
Lemma 2 All the initiators (irrespective of m) initiate in state I3.
Intuitively, if in state I3, the initiator must have chosen to initiate in the previous
period (in state I2) even in the presence of uncertainty about whether the respondent
would respond honestly or dishonestly. Consequently, the initiator will also initiate
once it is certain that the respondent will respond honestly.
This lemma and (9) then imply that
I3(m) = (1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + ®[a + ±I3(m)]






(1 ¡ ®±)(1 ¡ ± + ¯±)
I2(m) (11)
Note the importance of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2: they imply that a successful
completion of the transaction in the initial period of a match is a suﬃcient signal for
both sides for developing trust and trustworthiness between them. This manifests
itself in successful completion of the transaction in every subsequent period for as
long as the match lasts.9
Now we can ﬁnalize the partial equilibrium analysis. Using the result of Lemma
2, k, which is the belief of the respondent in state R3 that the initiator will initiate
9Once trust and trustworthiness have been established, the expected survival time of a match
is ®
1¡® periods past the current period.
15in the next period if the match survives until then, becomes 1 in (6). The latter,
combined with (3) and (5), then gives
R3(d) = max
½
1 ¡ ± + ¯±p
1 ¡ ±
(1 ¡ d);
1 ¡ ± + ¯±p







where, as before, the ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of re-
sponding dishonestly, while the second term corresponds to the value of responding
honestly.
Lemma 3 A respondent d responds honestly in state R3 if and only if d ¸ d(p) ´
1 ¡ a
1¡®±+®¯±p.
This result is a straightforward implication of (12) and Assumption 3 and its
proof is left to the reader.
Lemma 3 says that, in a new match, respondents with a relatively high level
of intrinsic honesty will behave in a trustworthy way and reply honestly, while
respondents with a relatively low intrinsic honesty will not behave in a trustworthy
way and they will reply dishonestly. This is so because the latter group will ﬁnd theft
attractive because of their low ”moral barriers”, even though it entails termination
of the match. On the other hand, the former group will not ﬁnd theft attractive
either because of their high ”moral barriers” or because of reputation reasons, since
it is more proﬁtable for them to continue the match, even though they would behave
dishonestly in a non-repeated setting. The threshold d(p) is an increasing function
of p, the aggregate steady state probability of an initiator initiating in a new match.
Note that this implies that trust breeds untrustworthiness. The more trusting the
16population, the more attractive acting in an untrustworthy way is. This is because
the more likely the initiators are to trust strangers, the easier it is to get into
state R3 (new match with an initiated transaction) if unmatched at the beginning
of a period, and hence the less costly it is to forego reputation (and hence break
up the match) by stealing relative to the gain from stealing, which is unchanged.
Consequently, more respondents will choose to respond dishonestly in a new match
with an initiated transaction. Note, however, that respondents with d ¸ 1 never
choose to behave dishonestly.




1 ¡ ± + ¯±
1 ¡ ±
m;
(q + aq ¡ 1 + ®± ¡ ®±q)(1 ¡ ± + ¯±)







where, as before, the ﬁrst term in the maximand corresponds to the value of not
initiating, while the second term corresponds to the value of initiating.




Again, this result is a straightforward implication of (13) and Assumption 3 and
its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4 says that, in a new match, initiators with a relatively high level of
intrinsic trust will behave in a trusting way and initiate, while initiators with a
relatively low intrinsic trust will not trust and thus will not initiate. The threshold
m(q) is a decreasing function of q, the aggregate steady state probability of a re-
spondent responding honestly in a new match. This is intuitive. The more likely the
17respondents are to behave honestly in a new match, the more initiators will choose
to trust them. In particular, a higher value of q implies a decreased likelihood of
theft and an increased likelihood of a mutually proﬁtable long-term relationship.
Lemmata 1through 4 completely characterize initiator and respondent behavior
in all states where they need to make a decision. They relate this behavior to
aggregate measures of trusting (p) and trustworthy (q) behavior in new matches. Of
course, the latter are not exogenous and should themselves be treated as aggregates
of individual behavior. The next section turns to this task.
2.3 General Equilibrium Analysis
This section builds on Lemmata 1 through 4 in characterizing the general equi-
librium in the society. The central idea is simple: an equilibrium is a pair (p;q) that
is mutually consistent under the initiator-respondent interactions. To elaborate in
more detail, consider a particular value of p and how this value maps to a value
of q consistent with it. By Lemma 3, the respondents with d ¸ d(p) respond hon-
estly if called to respond in a new match, while the others respond dishonestly. To
simplify the language, call the former ones ”trustworthy” and call the latter ones
”untrustworthy”. It follows that the measure of trustworthy respondents is Q ´
1 ¡ F [d(p)] and the measure of untrustworthy respondents is 1 ¡ Q = F [d(p)].10
10To clarify the notation, note that q is the conditional steady state probability measure of
trustworthy respondents, where the conditioning is based on the set of searching respondents.
When multiplied by the steady state measure of searching respondents, it gives the measure of
searching respondents who stand ready to behave in a trustworthy way in the current period (or any
other speciﬁc period). On the other hand, Q is the unconditional steady state probability measure
of trustworthy respondents. That is, it is the measure of respondents who would behave in a
trustworthy way if they happened to ﬁnd themselves in a new match with an initiated transaction
in the current period (or any other speciﬁc period).
18Since q is the aggregate steady state probability of a respondent responding honestly
in a new match, it must be equal to the fraction of trustworthy searching respon-
dents among the searching respondents. Because all the untrustworthy respondents
search at the beginning of each period (since they never participate in a surviving
match), we only need to ﬁnd the fraction of trustworthy respondents that search in
order to deduce q. Denote the latter fraction hR. Since this fraction has to stay
constant over time in a steady state, in any period the measure of new matches
involving trustworthy respondents that survive until the following period has to be
equal to the measure of surviving matches involving trustworthy respondents that
get dissolved in the current period. As for the former, the fraction hR of trustwor-
thy respondents that search results in the fraction ¯hR of trustworthy respondents
involved in new matches, the fraction p¯hR of trustworthy respondents involved in
new matches experiencing an initiated transaction, the fraction p¯hR of trustworthy
respondents involved in new matches experiencing a successfully completed trans-
action and, ﬁnally, the fraction ®p¯hR of trustworthy respondents involved in new
matches that survive until the following period. As for the latter, the fraction 1¡hR
of trustworthy respondents participating in surviving matches results in the fraction
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ hR) of trustworthy respondents participating in surviving matches that





1 ¡ ® + ®¯p
(14)
19Consequently, the measure of searching respondents is F [d(p)]+ 1¡®
1¡®+®¯p f1 ¡ F [d(p)]g.
The previous analysis then implies that the value of q that is consistent with p is
given by q = T(p), where T : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] is deﬁned by
T(p) ´
1¡®
1¡®+®¯q f1 ¡ F [d(p)]g
F [d(p)] + 1¡®
1¡®+®¯q f1 ¡ F [d(p)]g
=
(1 ¡ ®)f1 ¡ F [d(p)]g
1 ¡ ® + ®¯pF [d(p)]
(15)
8p 2 [0;1].
Now consider a particular value of q and how this value maps to a value of p
consistent with it. By Lemma 4, the initiators with m ¸ m(q) initiate in a new
match, while the others do not. Call the former ones ”trusting” and the latter
ones ”mistrusting”. It follows that the measure of trusting initiators is P ´ 1 ¡
G[m(q)] and the measure of mistrusting initiators is 1 ¡ P = G[m(q)].11 Since p is
the aggregate steady state probability of an initiator initiating in a new match, it
must be equal to the fraction of trusting searching initiators among the searching
initiators. Because all the mistrusting initiators search at the beginning of each
period (since they never participate in a surviving match), we only need to ﬁnd the
fraction of trusting initiators that search in order to deduce p. Denote the latter hI.




1 ¡ ® + ®¯q
(16)
11Again, to clarify the notation, note that p is the conditional steady state probability measure
of trusting initiators, where the conditioning is based on the set of searching initiators. When
multiplied by the steady state measure of searching initiators, it gives the measure of searching
initiators who actually behave in a trusting way in the current period (or any other speciﬁc period).
On the other hand, P is the unconditional steady state probability measure of trusting initiators.
That is, it is the measure of initiators who would behave in a trusting way if they happened to
ﬁnd themselves in a new match in the current period (or any other speciﬁc period).
20Consequently, the measure of searching initiators is G[m(q)]+ 1¡®
1¡®+®¯q f1 ¡ G[m(q)]g.
The previous analysis then implies that a value of p that is consistent with q is given
by p = V (q), where V : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] is deﬁned by
V (q) ´
1¡®
1¡®+®¯q f1 ¡ G[m(q)]g
G[m(q)] + 1¡®
1¡®+®¯q f1 ¡ G[m(q)]g
=
(1 ¡ ®)f1 ¡ G[m(q)]g
1 ¡ ® + ®¯qG[m(q)]
(17)
8q 2 [0;1].
We now deﬁne a general equilibrium formally:
Deﬁnition 1 A general trust/trustworthiness equilibrium is a pair (p¤;q¤) 2 [0;1]2
that satisﬁes p¤ = V (q¤) and q¤ = T(p¤).1213
12A reader may wonder why we do not impose an additional equilibrium condition requiring that
the measure of searching initiators be equal to the measure of searching respondents, i.e., that
G[m(q¤)] +
1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® + ®¯q¤ f1 ¡ G[m(q¤)]g = F [d(p¤)] +
1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® + ®¯p¤ f1 ¡ F [d(p¤)]g (18)
However, this additional requirement is redundant since this equality is guaranteed for any existing
equilibrium. To see that, the two equilibrium conditions imply that
G[m(q¤)] =
(1 ¡ p¤)(1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ ® + ®¯p¤q¤ (19)
and
F [d(p¤)] =
(1 ¡ q¤)(1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ ® + ®¯p¤q¤ (20)
Using these results, both sides of the (18) are equal to
h =
1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® + ®¯p¤q¤ (21)
where h denotes a common measure of searching initiators and respondents in an equilibrium.
13Given a particular general equilibrium (p¤;q¤) of aggregate steady state probabilities of initia-
tors initiating and respondents responding honestly in a new match, one can deduce the equilibrium
measures of trusting initiators and trustworthy respondents, that is P¤ and Q¤, by
P¤ = 1 ¡ G[m(q¤)] (22)
and
Q¤ = 1 ¡ F [d(p¤)] (23)
21The next theorem establishes existence of a general equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There exists a general trust/trustworthiness equilibrium.
Although existence can be established by a routine argument, uniqueness is
not guaranteed by the previous assumptions. To see this, note that because d(:)
is increasing, T is decreasing. However, although m(:) is decreasing, an increasing
property of V cannot be deduced. Intuitively, an increase in p has two eﬀects. First,
the trustworthiness threshold d(p) increases and hence there will be less trustwor-
thy and more untrustworthy respondents in the overall population of respondents.
Second, as can be seen from (14), a lower fraction of trustworthy respondents will
be searching. Ceteris paribus, each eﬀect tends to reduce the share of trustworthy
searching respondents among the searching respondents. That is, both eﬀects work
in the same direction and T(p) decreases as a result. Similarly, an increase in q
has two eﬀects. First, the trust threshold m(q) decreases and hence there will be
more trusting and less mistrusting initiators in the overall population of initiators.
Second, as can be seen from (16), a lower fraction of trusting initiators will be
searching. Ceteris paribus, the ﬁrst eﬀect tends to increase the share of trusting
searching initiators among the searching initiators, while the second eﬀect has just
the opposite impact. Hence the two eﬀects work in opposite directions, and it is not
in general possible to say which one will prevail.14 Figure 2 illustrates a case when
both T and V are monotone, which results in a unique general equilibrium.
14Facing a possibility of multiple equilibria, one may wonder whether there would be a convenient
suﬃcient condition that would rule such case out. (19) and (20) imply that
(1 ¡ p¤)F [d(p¤)] = (1 ¡ q¤)G[m(q¤)] (24)
22q
p







FIGURE 2: Illustration of general equilibrium
3 Empirical Predictions for Individual Prosperity
We are interested in how individual prosperity depends on whether one trusts
or not and on whether one is or is not trustworthy. To be able to do that, we
need to pick a measure of prosperity. Because the inherent utility of honesty and
the inherent utility of trust are unobservable, our primary measure of individual
prosperity is an expected, or average, payoﬀ in a single period, net of either type of
inherent utility.
Conceptually, there is a particular steady state equilibrium in the background.
in any general equilibrium. Suppose there are at least two equilibria. Then (24) has to be satisﬁed




2), where, without loss of generality,
p¤
1 < p¤
2. Since T is strictly decreasing, it must also be the case that q¤
1 > q¤
2. Now consider
a shift from the ﬁrst to the second equilibrium. Because m(:) is decreasing, the right-hand side
of (24) increases and hence so must the left-hand side to preserve the equality. Therefore a
convenient suﬃcient condition to rule out multiplicity of equilibria is to require that (1¡p)F [d(p)]
is nonincreasing in p. However, we do not wish to impose this assumption since it is not essential
for our objectives.
23In that equilibrium, an individual, be it an initiator or a respondent, may ﬁnd herself
or himself in ﬁve diﬀerent outcomes at the end of a typical period.15 First, (s)he may
be matched in a surviving match. Second, (s)he may be unmatched. Third, (s)he
may be matched in a new match without an initiated transaction. Fourth, (s)he may
be matched in a new match with an initiated transaction and an honest response.
Fifth, (s)he may be matched in a new match with an initiated transaction, but with
a dishonest response. Let the steady state probabilities of these ﬁve outcomes be, in
the same order, ¼I(m;i) and ¼R(d;i), i 2 f1;2;3;4;5g, for initiators of type m and
respondents of type d, respectively. The per period payoﬀs for both the initiators
and the respondents are a in outcome 1 and 4, 0 in outcome 2 and 3, and they are
¡1 for the initiators and 1 for the respondents in outcome 5. Hence the expected




















In order to be able to compute these expected payoﬀs, we need to ﬁnd the steady
state equilibrium probability distribution over the ﬁve outcomes for each initiator
and for each respondent. This is the task to which we turn now.
15Note that the concept of outcome is diﬀerent from the concept of state. While states are
various ex ante decisionmaking situations, outcomes are various ex post payoﬀ situations.
24The ﬁrst step in this process involves ﬁnding the fraction (or conditional mea-
sure) of initiators and the fraction of respondents of each type who search at the
beginning of a generic period. Given the latter, the probability distribution over
the individual outcomes for each type can be computed using the exogenous match-
ing probability ¯ together with an equilibrium degree of trusting and trustworthy
behavior, both on the aggregate and the individual level. As in the previous sec-
tion, one only needs to distinguish between trusting and mistrusting initiators and
trustworthy and untrustworthy respondents, since behavior is uniform within each
of these groups. Let p : [0;1] ! [0;1] be a function that maps initiator types to equi-






1 if m ¸ m(q¤) (trusting initiators)
0 otherwise (mistrusting initiators)
(27)
Also let q : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] be a function that maps respondent types to equilib-
rium probabilities of (respondents of that type) responding honestly to an initiated





1 if d ¸ d(p¤) (trustworthy respondents)
0 otherwise (untrustworthy respondents)
(28)
Now let hI : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] be a function that maps initiator types to equilibrium
fractions (of initiators of that type) that search at the beginning of each period and
25let hR : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] be a function that maps respondent types to equilibrium
fractions (of respondents of that type) that search at the beginning of each period.







1¡®+®¯q¤ if m ¸ m(q¤) (trusting initiators)









1¡®+®¯p¤ if d ¸ d(p¤) (trustworthy respondents)
1 otherwise (untrustworthy respondents)
(30)
Given the functional forms of pI, pR, hI and hR, Figures 3 and 4 depict the prob-
ability distribution over the ﬁve outcomes for initiators of type m and respondents
of type d, respectively.





















a + [1 ¡ q(d)]p
¤¯h
R(d) (32)
Finally, after using (27), (28), (29) and (30) to substitute into (31) and (32), the
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¯ [q¤a ¡ (1 ¡ q¤)(1 ¡ ®)]
1 ¡ ® + ®¯q¤ ; (33)
the expected per period payoﬀ for a mistrusting initiator is
Π
I
mistrusting = 0; (34)





1 ¡ ® + ®¯p¤a; (35)






trusting may be more or less than ΠI
mistrusting, depending on the
value of the parameters and the shapes of F and G. So it is not possible to con-
clude in general whether trust does or does not increase expected income (i.e., ”pay
oﬀ”). However, for q¤ = 0 we have ΠI
trusting = ¡¯ < ΠI
mistrusting, for q¤ = 1 we
have ΠI
trusting = ¯a=(1 ¡ ® + ®¯) > ΠI
mistrusting, and ΠI
trusting is continuous and
strictly increasing in q¤. Therefore we can conclude that trust does not pay oﬀ in
low trustworthiness societies, but it does pay oﬀ in high trustworthiness societies.
Furthermore, it pays oﬀ more the more trustworthy a society is. The threshold value
of q¤ that makes the two payoﬀs equal is b q ´ 1¡®

















FIGURE 5: Expected equilibrium payoﬀs of trusting and mistrusting initiators as
functions of q¤
and it does not pay oﬀ if q¤ < b q. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Similarly, ΠR
trustworthy may be more or less than ΠR
untrustworthy and hence it is not
possible to conclude in general whether trustworthiness does or does not pay oﬀ. For
p¤ = 0 we have ΠR
trustworthy = ΠR
untrustworthy. Since ΠR
trustworthy is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in p¤, three scenarios, depicted in Figure 6, are possible. First,
if a ¸ 1 ¡ ® + ®¯, the ”high” case, trustworthiness pays oﬀ no matter what the
social level of trust p¤ is. Second, if 1 ¡ ® + ®¯ > a > 1 ¡ ®, the ”medium” case,
trustworthiness pays oﬀ for low levels of social trust, in particular p¤ · b p ´
a¡(1¡®)
®¯ ,
but it does not pay oﬀ for high levels of social trust, i.e. when p¤ > b p. Third, if
1 ¡ ® > a, the ”low” case, trustworthiness does not pay oﬀ for any level of social
trust.
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FIGURE 6: Payoﬀs of trustworthy and untrustworthy respondents as functions of
p¤
aspects of countries that determine the equilibrium values of p¤ and q¤ - the distri-
butions G(:) and F(:) of inherent attitudes, and the values of ®, ¯, ± and a—also
aﬀect the diﬀerence in expected income between trusting and not trusting for any
given level of q¤, and between being and not being trustworthy for any given level of
p¤. For this reason, one cannot interpret Figures 5 and 6 as directly revealing how
the expected diﬀerence in income depends on the values of p¤ and q¤. Many of the
variations in fundamentals that aﬀect p¤ and q¤ will also aﬀect the expected income
of a person conditional on their attitude.
This stylized model of how individual attitudes combine to generate an equilib-
rium provides the framework we use in the empirical analysis of whether trust and
trustworthiness pay oﬀ that we develop in Sections 5 and 6. In particular, we will
30examine the model’s prediction that the payoﬀ to exhibiting each of these behav-
iors depends on the aggregate prevalence of the complementary attitude. Before we
begin the empirical analysis, though, we brieﬂy review the empirical literature that
is related to our investigation.
4 Empirical Literature Review16
There is some empirical evidence that trust and civic duty among a country’s
citizens contribute to growth. Knack and Keefer (1997) tested the impact of these
attitudes on both growth and investment rates in a cross-section of 29 countries,
using measures of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys of 1981 and
1990. They ﬁnd that social capital variables exhibit a strong and signiﬁcant positive
relationship to economic growth. As they note, the causality of this relationship
could go in either direction: trust could be a product of optimism generated by high
or growing incomes, or it could be that trust facilitates prosperity. However, they
ﬁnd that trust is more correlated with per capita income in later years than with
income in earlier years, suggesting that the causation runs from trust to growth
more so than vice versa.
Zak and Knack (2001) extend the Knack and Keefer framework by separately
testing for the eﬀect on growth of proxies for the presence of formal institutions,
social distance, and discrimination and for whether their eﬀect remains signiﬁcantly
16In this review, we focus on the impact of trust and trustworthiness on economic
outcomes. There is also literature studying the determinants of trust. See Alesina
and Ferrara (2000) for a recent contribution.
31correlated with growth controlling for measures of trust. They ﬁnd that trust is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to growth even in the presence of measures of
formal institutions or of social distance, but that most of the inﬂuence of the latter
on growth occurs through their impact on trust. The one exception is a measure of
property rights, which retains its independent positive association with growth even
in the presence of a trust variable. They justify this ﬁnding by noting that this index
includes government actions against private agents. In contrast, the trust measure is
“likely to be little aﬀected by perceptions of the trustworthiness of government...”
(p. 316)
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) ﬁnd that, across coun-
tries, a one-standard deviation increase in the measure of trust increases judicial
eﬃciency by 0.7 of a standard deviation and reduces government corruption by
0.3 of a standard deviation. Putnam (1993) examines cross-regional Italian data
and concludes that local governments are more eﬃcient where there is greater civic
engagement.
In what follows, we use a somewhat diﬀerent empirical strategy by examining
household-level rather than country-level data from 18 countries. In particular,
we estimate regression equations explaining household income with a speciﬁcation
that is based on the standard earnings equations from labor economics, but that is
augmented to test for the impact of trust, trustworthiness and their interaction with
aggregate levels of the complementary attitude. The theoretical model of Sections
2 and 3 frames our approach.
325 Data
Although the theory provides a consistent framework in which to evaluate data,
it leaves open the precise relationship between income and personal and country
characteristics. To shed empirical light on the issues discussed in the previous
section, one needs measures of individual well-being, personal trust, trustworthiness
and, preferably, some additional sociodemographic variables. To our knowledge,
only two datasets provide this information: the National Opinion Research Center’s
General Social Survey (GSS) and the World Values Survey (WVS). In order to
identify the impact of aggregate trust and trustworthiness within the society, we
must use WVS, as it, unlike the GSS, provides individual-level data for multiple
countries.
The purpose of the WVS is to facilitate cross-national comparisons of values,
norms, and attitudes. The survey was conducted in multiple waves, with limited
national modiﬁcations, in several dozen countries. It asked about attitudes concern-
ing work, family, religion, politics, and contemporary social issues and gathered a
limited amount of demographic data as well. Although the data are subject to the
usual reservations about attitude surveys, and in particular cross-country attitude
surveys, the data has been widely and fruitfully used by political scientists and so-
ciologists, not to mention Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001). For
an extensive, albeit incomplete, list of its use in research, see Inglehart, Basanez,
and Moreno (1998). We use the data from the 1990-93 wave for 18 developed and
33developing countries.17 We excluded the former communist countries because their
economic and incentive structure as of the time of the survey was not conducive to
trust and trustworthiness having much eﬀect on individual prosperity.18 We supple-
ment the WVS data with Summers and Heston (1991) Penn World Tables (PWT),
Mark 5.6 to be able to make real income comparisons across countries.
Our measure of trust is based on the following WVS question: ”Generally speak-
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?” This question oﬀered two responses: ”can’t be too careful”
and ”most people can be trusted”. We associate the former answer with ”mis-
trusting” individuals and the latter answer with ”trusting” individuals. Based on
these survey responses, we create a binary variable TRUST indicating the trusting
individuals. Our measure of trustworthiness is based on the following WVS ques-
tion: ”Please tell me whether you think lying in your own interest can always be
justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed, or something in between.” This question oﬀered 10 re-
sponses ordered from 1 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed). In order to measure
trustworthiness, we reversed the scale and call the resulting variable TRUSTW.
Glaeser et al. (2000) measure trust and trustworthiness by conducting experi-
ments with monetary rewards. They ﬁnd that the standard question used to measure
17We use the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Chile, Finland,
India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, USA, and
West Germany.
18As for the remaining countries in the 1990-93 wave, we could not use Argentina, Denmark,
Ireland, Nigeria, Norway, Sweeden, and Switzerland because the income category thresholds that
we use for measuring real household income (see below) were not available. We could not use
France because the household income data records did not precisely match with the available
income category thresholds. We could not use Iceland because of the missing household income
data. Finally, we could not use South Korea because of the missing education data.
34trusting behavior - used in the WVS as well as the GSS - does not have a signiﬁcant
correlation with trusting choices in either of two experiments. Two other questions,
speciﬁcally about trusting strangers, do, though, predict trust (of strangers, in their
experiments). Furthermore, the answers to questions about trustworthiness are not
signiﬁcantly related to trustworthy behavior. Surprisingly, a self-reported trusting
attitude does appear to predict trustworthy behavior. Danielson and Holm (2002)
conduct a similar experiment in Tanzania. They conﬁrm that the standard survey
question used to measure trust does not predict actual trusting behavior in their ex-
perimental setting. Unlike Glaeser et al. (2000), though, they ﬁnd that the speciﬁc
trust questions do not predict actual trusting behavior and that the general trust
question does not predict trustworthy behavior. They also ﬁnd that self-reported
trustworthiness does in fact predict trustworthy behavior, but this eﬀect disappears
when donation motives are controlled for.
Glaeser et al. (2000) and Danielson and Holm (2002) conclude that empirical
work based on the WVS/GSS survey questions about trust needs to be reinterpreted.
While we take seriously the possibility that self-reported attitudes and behavior
may not be highly correlated, we do ﬁnd below that these self-reports help explain
individual incomes with a systematic pattern, and so we conclude that they do reﬂect
individual behavior in an important sense. Finally, although experimental evidence
could certainly extend our knowledge of these issues, we expect that such evidence
will not be available across countries in the near future, rendering the current study
infeasible from this angle.
We measure individual prosperity by real household income based on the follow-
35ing WVS question: ”Here is the scale of incomes and we would like to know in what
group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes
that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes
and other deductions.” This question oﬀered 10 country-speciﬁc ranges for income.
We convert the thresholds into 1990 purchasing power parity U.S. dollars using the
PWT measure of PPP-based exchange rates. Our measure of real household income
is a midpoint of each range and 150% of the highest threshold for the top range.
Summary statistics for household income, trust and trustworthiness by country are
reported in Table 1.
Because individual trust and trustworthiness are certainly not to be the only
determinants of individual income, we examine additional sociodemographic infor-
mation provided by WVS. Our measure of respondent education is based on the
following WVS question: ”At what age did you or will you complete your full time
education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude
apprenticeships.” This question oﬀered a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (12 years
of age or earlier) to 10 (21 years of age or older). In addition, we use the data on
respondent age and gender. It is important to note that the measure of income we
investigate relates to the household, but both the attitude indicators and sociode-
mographic variables refer to the respondent. We will have more to say later about























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 reports our baseline results.19 It presents the results of regressing the
logarithm of real household income against variables that are standard in micro earn-
ings equations plus indicators of the individual’s level of trust and trustworthiness,
sometimes interacted with the mean level of these variables in the respondent’s coun-
try. All of the regressions include country dummy variables (coeﬃcients of which are
not reported here), and so all the estimated coeﬃcients are identiﬁed from within-
country variation only. In all reported speciﬁcations, these country dummies are
jointly signiﬁcant at 1 percent level. The speciﬁcation in Column (1) contains only
the standard variables in an earnings equation. The results are in line with the
empirical literature discussed above, lending credence to the survey-based measures
of income, education, age, and gender. The marginal return to the respondent’s ed-
ucation level is always positive within the observed range (between 6 and 15 years),
although decreasing. Based on the estimated coeﬃcients, going from zero to ten
years of education adds 87 percent to income. Furthermore, the marginal return is
11.1 percent per year at 0 years, and falls to 6.29 percent at 10 years. These results
are within the range reported in the literature , as discussed earlier.20 The respon-
19The regressions are calculated using observations unweighted within countries and with sums
of weights equalized across countries. We have also estimated analogous regressions without any
(cross-country) weight adjustment and with weighting within and across countries combined. None
of the principal results reported in this section are aﬀected by this change.
20In the human capital earnings approach standard in labor economics, more recent estimates
of the return to education fall anywhere between 0.023 (Isacsson (1999)) and 0.153 (Harmon and
Walker (1995)) per additional year of schooling, depending on the dataset used, the set of control









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39dent’s age, which is undoubtedly partly a proxy for work experience, initially has a
positive impact on income, but its impact peaks at age 38.8, and it has a marginal
negative eﬀect thereafter. The marginal return falls from 1.78 percent per year at
age 20 to –2.96 percent per year at age 70.21 Households with male respondents
have an 8.37 percent higher income. Although this is lower in absolute value than
the ﬁndings in the literature22, the diﬀerence is unsurprising as our results relate
to household income rather than the respondent’s income. In the next subsection,
we restrict the sample to include only those households in which the major earn-
ers are the respondents and observe a much larger estimated male-female income
diﬀerential.
Columns 2 through 4 show the estimated return to individual trust and trust-
worthiness, ignoring any country-level interaction eﬀect. The results suggest that
trust, but not trustworthiness, is associated with higher income. Complete trust
increases income by 7.33 percent compared to no trust at all. In contrast, complete
trustworthiness decreases income by 10.53 percent compared to no trustworthiness
at all.23 A one standard deviation increase in trust increases income by 3.50 per-
Our marginal eﬀect estimates lie within this range.
21Angrist and Krueger (1999), using 1990 Census and March 1990 CPS samples, report coeﬃcient
estimates on potential experience around 0.041 per year for the Census data and 0 or 0.013 for the
CPS data, depending on whether they do or do not use the allocated CPS values. The coeﬃcient
estimates on potential experience squared are from -0.00057 to -0.00055 for the Census data and
they are statistically insigniﬁcant for the CPS data. Our results are similar to these estimates.
22Altonji and Blank (1999), using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data, estimate the
coeﬃcient on a female indicator variable to be -0.421 in 1979 when the additional controls are
education, experience and region, and -0.348 when occupation, industry and job characteristics
are controlled for as well. In 1995, these estimates are -0.272 and -0.221, respectively. When using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data from 1994, the coeﬃcient estimates on the female
dummy are approximately -0.24 to -0.20.
23We obtain this numeric result by multiplying the coeﬃcient of 1.17 percent by 9, which is the
numeric diﬀerence between maximum (10) and minimum (1) measured trustworthiness.
40cent, and a one standard deviation increase in trustworthiness decreases income by
2.81 percent. Column 4 shows that the point estimates are not notably changed by
including both variables at once.
Columns 5 and 6 present our central results that allow for interaction between
personal characteristics and country-level means of trust and trustworthiness. Col-
umn 5 reveals that the personal return to trust is larger, the greater is the prevalence
of trustworthy people in the country. Moreover, the personal return to trusting be-
havior is negative unless these behavioral patterns are rewarded. The return to trust
is negative in countries that have average trustworthiness below 6.92, and is positive
in countries above that. All of the countries in our sample, except for Mexico, have
means greater than 6.90, and hence the return to trust is almost always positive in
our sample.
Column 6 shows that the same pattern applies to trustworthiness: its eﬀect on
individual income is negative unless one lives in a country where the level of trust is
above 0.48. In contrast to column 5, though, in all but four countries the mean level
of trust falls short of this ﬁgure, with the four exceptions being Canada, Finland,
the Netherlands and the U.S. Thus, our results suggest that trustworthiness is in
most countries not rewarded with higher income—dishonesty pays. How much it
pays varies widely. In a very low trust country like Brazil, a one standard deviation
increase in trustworthiness is associated with an 8.6 percent decrease in income.
Column 7 shows that the principal results from columns 5 and 6 are unchanged
when both attitude variables and both interaction terms are included in the same
equation, although statistical signiﬁcance decreases due to multicollinearity. The
41results in this column imply that the return to trust is positive if average trustwor-
thiness exceeds the threshold of 6.78 and the return to trustworthiness is negative
unless average trust exceeds 0.507.
As suggested earlier by the gender diﬀerential estimates, a potential problem
with these results is that we use household real income as a dependent variable
and respondent attitudes and demographic characteristics as independent variables.
However, it has been shown (see, for example, Mare (1991) and the references con-
tained therein) that most married or cohabiting couples are characterized by as-
sortative matching by education, age and many other characteristics, thus lending
more credibility to our results. Another potential problem is that we restrict the
coeﬃcient estimates to be the same across all the countries. It is also possible that
trust and trustworthiness are endogenous to income. We address all of these issues
in the next subsection.
6.2 Robustness Analysis
In this subsection, we submit our baseline results to four robustness checks. The
ﬁrst two of them pursue the possibility that the key interaction terms are estimated
with bias because they are picking up country-speciﬁc variations in the eﬀect on
income of education, age, and gender. The third check returns to the issue of using
household rather than individual income as our dependent variable. Finally, we
discuss the implications for our results and remedies for dealing with a potential
endogeneity problem due to the possibility of reverse causal impacts running from
income to trust and trustworthiness.
42In the ﬁrst robustness test, we retain the structure of our baseline regressions, but
allow the coeﬃcients on education, education squared, age, age squared and gender
to vary across countries. The coeﬃcient estimates on the variables of interest after
enriching the regression speciﬁcation in this way are shown in Table 3.24 The sign
pattern is completely unaﬀected. The absolute value of all the estimates are scaled
back toward zero, by between one-ﬁfth and three-ﬁfths. Because the standard errors
of these estimates fall only slightly, the t-statistics all decline, so that the conﬁdence
with which we can say these coeﬃcients are not zero also falls. Notably, though,
the relative magnitude of the individual and interaction terms in equations (5) and
(6) are only slightly changed, so that the estimated cutoﬀ levels of aggregate trust
and trustworthiness are not much diﬀerent.
The second robustness test is even more rigorous. We conduct it in a two-
step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate regression equations (2), (3) and
(4) separately for each country in the sample. This produces, for each equation, 18
separate estimates of the eﬀect of trust or trustworthiness on real household income.
These ﬁrst-step estimates are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.25 The
third panel in this table contains the average values of trust and trustworthiness in
each country for comparison purposes. In the second step, we regress the estimated
trust coeﬃcients against the country average level of trustworthiness, and vice versa.
24The regressions are calculated using observations that are unweighted within countries, but
with the sums of weights equalized across countries. We have also estimated analogous regressions
without any (cross-country) weight adjustment, and with weighting within and across countries
combined. In this case the coeﬃcient estimates are quantitatively more sensitive to the particular
weighting scheme employed. However, the results are aﬀected qualitatively only to the extent of
marginal changes in statistical signiﬁcance.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44This procedure imposes much less structure on the form of the interaction between
individual characteristics and the average level of the complementary attitude.
The results of the second-stage regressions are shown in Table 5. Panel A re-
veals that the country-speciﬁc estimates of the eﬀect of trust on real income are not
signiﬁcantly related to the average country level of trustworthiness, although the
coeﬃcient estimates are positive. This is likely a consequence of the fact that there
are only 18 countries in our sample, and hence it is diﬃcult to reach standard levels
of signiﬁcance. However, Panel B shows that, even with only 18 observations, the
estimated country-speciﬁc eﬀect of an individual’s trustworthiness on real income is
positively related to the average trust in the country, and the coeﬃcient is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at a 5% conﬁdence level. Thus, this two-step procedure
does not corroborate the results of speciﬁcation (5) in Tables 2 and 3, but it does
corroborate the ﬁndings in speciﬁcation (6).
The third robustness check returns to the issue of having household real income
as a dependent variable and respondent attitudes and demographic characteristics
as independent variables. As we mentioned already, this issue is likely to be less
important for the education and age variables (due to assortative matching of house-
hold members) than it is for the gender variable. In this check, we run our baseline
speciﬁcations (as in Table 2), but we include only those households where the re-
spondent coincides with a major or equal wage earner within the household. The
results are shown in Table 6. Compared to Table 2, the coeﬃcient estimates are
similar and the country dummies are also jointly signiﬁcant at 1 percent level. A






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46TABLE 5: Second stage: The impact of average trustworthiness and trust on per-
sonal return to trust and trustworthiness
Dependent variable: A: Trust coeﬃcient B: Trustworthiness coeﬃcient
First stage: Trustworth. Trustworth. Trust Trust





Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.17
Note 1: Ordering of columns corresponds to Table 4.
Note 2: Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level
notation: ¤ at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at 1%.
statistical signiﬁcance in speciﬁcations (5) and (7), although they retain the now-
familiar sign pattern. Note that the conclusions from this robustness check mirror
the ones from the previous check: the personal return to trust is not statistically
signiﬁcantly related to the average level of trustworthiness in society, but the per-
sonal return to trustworthiness is positively and statistically signiﬁcantly related
to the average level of trust in society. Also note that, as expected, the estimated
impact on income of being a male is now much higher, by a factor of four, compared
to Table 2.
Finally, we return to the issue of what the WVS trust (and, to a lesser degree,
trustworthiness) responses really measure. Glaeser, in particular, has argued that
higher-income people are more likely to say they trust others, in part because rich
people can eﬀectively punish those who act in an untrustworthy way towards them.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48running from income to the trust (and possibly trustworthiness) response, and the
coeﬃcients estimated here do not measure the structural eﬀect of attitudes on in-
come.
A natural approach to this concern is to identify a set of instrumental variables
that are correlated with trust (or trustworthiness), but which are not inﬂuenced by
income. With this objective, we investigated a wide variety of survey responses.26
In the case of trust, the instruments that we considered either lacked statistically
signiﬁcant explanatory power for trust and trust interacted with aggregate trustwor-
thiness in the ﬁrst stage or, alternatively, led to very imprecise (as measured by the
standard errors) and unstable (across various speciﬁcations) estimates of the coeﬃ-
cients on predicted trust and trust interacted with aggregate trustworthiness in the
second stage. In contrast, we could identify apparently appropriate instruments for
trustworthiness, and two-stage least squares estimates yielded qualitatively similar
results to those reported in the paper.27 Thus, with respect to the trust measure we
regard the issue of potential reverse causation as unsettled, and an important topic
for future research. We are less concerned that this is a problem for our estimates
of the impact of individual trustworthiness and its interaction with aggregate trust
26To be speciﬁc, we investigated answers to whether the respondent considers himself/herself
to be a religious person, whether religion is important in his/her life, whether he/she was raised
religiously, whether he/she thinks it is important to teach children responsibility, whether he/she
would mind having (each category individually) people with criminal record, emotionally unstable
people, heavy drinkers, and drug addicts as neighbors, whether he/she considers having friends
and acquaintances to be an important aspect of life, whether he/she considers meeting people to
be an important job attribute, and whether he/she has conﬁdence in the civil service.
27In particular, using religious variables as instruments for trustworthiness and their interactions
with aggregate trust as instruments for trustworthiness interacted with aggregate trust, the coeﬃ-
cient on trustworthiness in speciﬁcations (3) and (4) of Table 2 was reduced to about ¡0:1, and the
sign pattern and the relative magnitude of the coeﬃcients on trustworthiness and trustworthiness




Earlier research has established that countries with a high proportion of trusting
citizens tend to have higher per capita income and to grow faster. What had not
been established is the incentive people have to act in a trusting and trustworthy
manner. In this paper we address this issue by developing an equilibrium model
of trust and trustworthiness and empirically investigating whether the return to
behaving this way depends on the mean amount of the complementary behavior
in the society. We ﬁnd evidence that the personal return to trustworthiness is
nonpositive in countries with low levels of average trust, but it is increasing in the
latter and eventually positive. On the other hand, the personal return to trust is
positive on average, but we are unable to conclude at standard levels of statistical
signiﬁcance that this return is increasing in the average level of trustworthiness in
the society.
What our empirical results suggest is that personal attitudes matter for personal
prosperity and that the payoﬀ to trustworthiness is related to the aggregate trust
level in society. These empirical regularities should inform future theories of the role
and interaction of trust and trustworthiness. Although these results are interesting
and suggestive in many dimensions, more research is necessary to further reﬁne
these ﬁndings. First, given the diﬃculty in linking the survey measure of trust to
observed behavior in trust game experiments, we need to verify the validity of our
50current measure in other settings and/or develop and implement a more reliable
survey instrument. Second, more work is necessary to sort out the causal links
between trust, trustworthiness and prosperity.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a respondent d. Suppose that the current match
lasted for two or more periods before the current period. In that case the respondent
must have been solving the problem identical to (4) in the previous period and he
must have chosen to respond honestly. Consequently, he will choose to respond
53honestly in the current period too. (This is, due to Assumption 3, true even if the
respondent is repeatedly indiﬀerent between the two actions.) Now suppose that
the current match lasted for only one period before the current period. It is easy
to see from (4) (also using Assumption 3) that it is optimal for the respondent to
respond dishonestly if and only if
®(1 ¡ ±)R1(d) > ¡(1 ¡ ®±)(1 ¡ d) + a .
If d ¸ 1, this entails R1(d) > a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. However, the best possible sequence of
payoﬀs the respondent can get is a forever (because replying dishonestly pays oﬀ
1 ¡ d · 0 < a), which has discounted value a=(1 ¡ ±) < a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. But this
contradicts R1(d) > a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. Therefore if d ¸ 1, the respondent will respond
honestly in state 5. Intuitively, if d ¸ 1, the respondent will respond honestly
whenever the transaction has been initiated, since he has too high a disutility from
behaving dishonestly. If d < 1, then (1) and (4) imply that R5(d) > R1(d) = R4(d),
which implies that the value associated with honest response in (4) is no less than
the value associated with honest response in (6), i.e. that
(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + ±R5(d)] ¸
(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + (1 ¡ k)±R4(d) + k±R5(d)]
54Because in the previous period the match was new and the respondent chose to
respond honestly, it must be the case that
(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + (1 ¡ k)±R4(d) + k±R5(d)] ¸ 1 ¡ d + R1(d)
and hence also
(1 ¡ ®)[a + R1(d)] + ®[a + ±R5(d)] ¸ 1 ¡ d + R1(d) .
Consequently, the respondent will choose to respond honestly in the current period.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an initiator m. Suppose that the current match
lasted for two or more periods before the current period. In that case the respondent
must have been solving the problem identical to (9) in the previous period and she
must have chosen to initiate. Consequently, she will choose to initiate in the current
period too. (This is, due to Assumption 3, true even if the initiator is repeatedly
indiﬀerent between the two actions.) Now suppose that the current match lasted
for only one period before the current period. It is easy to see from (9) (also using
Assumption 3) that it is optimal for the initiator not to initiate if and only if
®(1 ¡ ±)I1(m) > a + m .
If m ¸ 0, this entails I1(m) > a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. However, the best possible sequence
of payoﬀs the initiator can get is a forever (because not initiating pays oﬀ ¡m ·
550 < a), which has discounted value a=(1 ¡ ±) < a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. But this contradicts
R1(d) > a=[®(1 ¡ ±)]. Therefore if m ¸ 0, the initiator will initiate in state 3.
Intuitively, if m ¸ 1, the initiator will initiate whenever matched if the respondent
is known to respond honestly, since she has a disutility from not initiating. If m < 0,
(9) and (10) imply that
I2(m) · maxf¡m + I1(m);(1 ¡ q)[¡m + I1(m)]
+q(1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + q®[a + ±I3(m)]g
= qI3(m) + (1 ¡ q)[¡m + I1(m)]
· qI3(m) + (1 ¡ q)I3(m)
= I3(m)
Because in the previous period the match was new and the initiator chose to initiate,
it must be the case that
(1 ¡ q)[¡1 + I1(m)] + q(1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + q®[a + ±I3(m)] ¸ ¡m + I1(m)
and hence also
I2(m) = (1 ¡ q)[¡1 + I1(m)] + q(1 ¡ ®)[a + I1(m)] + q®[a + ±I3(m)] .
Combining the previous three results gives
I3(m) ¸ ¡m + I1(m) .
56Consequently, the initiator will choose to initiate in the current period.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let W : [0;1]2 ! [0;1]2 be deﬁned by
W(p;q) ´ (V (q);T(p)) 8(p;q) 2 [0;1]
2
Since F : R ! [0;1] and G : R ! [0;1] are both continuous, it follows from this
deﬁnition and (23) and (22) that the mapping W is continuous. Since [0;1]2 is a
closed, bounded and convex subset of R2, it follows by the Brouwer Fixed Point
Theorem that W has a ﬁxed point, i.e., a general trust/trustworthiness equilibrium
exists.
57